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PHIL 611

Measuring and Improving Reasoning in Humans and Machines

Graduate seminar · Fall 2026

The mechanisms that produce belief in us have largely been shaped by pressures that are not aimed at truth: natural selection, social approval, and institutional incentives. Language models are shaped by their own imperfect optimization pressures, including next-token prediction and feedback from human evaluators. This interdisciplinary seminar asks how those pressures affect reasoning in humans and machines, and what we can do to improve it.

We consider how to characterize cognitive errors, which interventions improve reasoning, and whether improvements transfer across tasks. A recurring question concerns measurement: can we devise tests of good reasoning where improving a score requires improving the underlying skill? We also examine sycophancy, confabulation, and deception in language models, and ask how reflection, training, and collaboration might produce more reliable epistemics.

The course brings philosophical analysis into conversation with empirical work in psychology and AI. Student projects move from concepts such as intellectual humility or probabilistic calibration to proposals for measurement and systematic improvement. Graduate students from other disciplines are welcome.

Topics and readings

Tentative schedule. I’ll add readings and link to them on this page as I decide on them.

September 8 · What is good human reasoning?

Normative reasoning standards; the "rationality wars"; some candidate maps of skills, biases and heuristics.

September 15 · What it takes for a machine to reason

When are folk-psychological attributions of beliefs, concepts, intentions, and reasoning literally true vs. merely predictively useful; what kind of evidence could distinguish them? When is the "reasoning" we see just a generated rationale?

September 22 · Goals, personas, constitutions

Do LLMs have goals, play roles, and/or have beliefs about characters in their dialogs? How do constitutions, pre-training, and post-training shape these dispositions, and which dispositions survive a change of persona/speaker/frame? How useful is a nested intentional stance picture?

Readings

September 29 · How well do reasoners understand their own judgments?

Do reasoners' accounts of their own reasoning reflect the real explanations for their answers? People and LLMs both confabulate, but in different ways. What's the difference between introspective awareness and confident guessing about one's internal states? When a model "introspects", whose states are being reported—the LLM's or the Assistant's?

Readings

October 6 · Monitoring, obfuscation, and optimization pressure

Monitoring chain-of-thought reasoning; obfuscation of CoT; evaluation awareness; Goodhart & Campbell; systemic validity in the human case. What unintended consequences can occur when we monitor reasoning and this either becomes part of the training signal, or the model can tell it's being tested? What steps can be taken to ensure the validity of a measure survives optimizing for that measure? Can we make training for a skill constitutive of acquiring a skill, for humans and for models?

Readings

October 27 · Incentives and trust

When should learning how a reasoner was shaped change how much we trust its reasoning? Kunda explains how wanting a conclusion can affect which evidence and inferential rules we use. OpenAI describes a case in which feedback intended to improve an assistant encouraged excessive agreement. Anthropic studies how rewarding shortcuts on programming tasks can change behavior elsewhere. Vavova asks what discoveries about the origins of our beliefs actually license us to conclude.